Who's got guts? Young infants expect animals to have insides by Setoh, Pei Pei
  
 
WHO’S GOT GUTS? 
YOUNG INFANTS EXPECT ANIMALS TO HAVE INSIDES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY 
 
PEI PEI SETOH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THESIS 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Master of Arts in Psychology 
in the Graduate College of the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2013 
 
 
 
 
Urbana, Illinois 
 
 
 
 
Adviser: 
 
 Professor Renée Baillargeon 
  ii 
ABSTRACT 
 
 What are the developmental origins of our concept of animal? There has long been 
controversy concerning this question. At issue is whether biological reasoning develops from 
earlier forms of reasoning, such as physical and psychological reasoning, or whether from a 
young age children endow animals with biological properties. Here we demonstrate that 8-
month-old infants already expect novel objects they identify as animals to have insides. Infants 
detected a violation when an object that was self-propelled and agentive (but not an object that 
lacked one or both of these properties) was revealed to be hollow. Infants also detected a 
violation when an object that was self-propelled and furry (but not an object that lacked one or 
both of these properties) either was shown to be hollow or rattled (when shaken) as though 
largely hollow. Young infants’ expectations about animals’ insides may serve as a foundation for 
the development of more advanced biological knowledge. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 By the end of the preschool years, children possess considerable biological knowledge. In 
particular, they expect the insides of animals to be different from those of artifacts (Gottfried & 
Gelman, 2005; Simons & Keil, 1995); they realize that the insides of an animal are essential for 
its functioning (e.g., a dog cannot bark after its insides are removed) (Gelman & Wellman, 1991; 
Gottfried, Gelman, & Schultz, 1999); and they are beginning to understand that certain behaviors, 
such as eating and drinking, are necessary to maintain the continued functioning of animals and 
their insides (Inagaki & Hatano, 1993; Morris, Taplin, & Gelman, 2000). This early biological 
knowledge is often characterized as a vitalistic biology in which internal organs and their 
workings sustain the vitality or life force of animals (Carey, 2000; Gutheil, Vera, & Keil, 1998; 
Hatano & Inagaki, 1994; Inagaki & Hatano, 2004). Does this vitalistic biology have roots in 
infancy? Do infants possess abstract expectations about animals that could lay the foundations 
for the development of more advanced biological knowledge? Below, we consider two broad 
hypotheses concerning these questions; we refer to them as the non-biological and the biological 
hypotheses. 
 According to the non-biological hypothesis, infants do not yet endow animals with any 
vitalistic or biological properties: Animals are simply entities that are self-propelled and agentive 
(for infants, these two properties are conceptually distinct (Baillargeon & Wu, 2009; Csibra, 
2008; Shimizu & Johnson, 2004)); objects may be self-propelled without being agentive, and 
they may be agentive without being self-propelled). Proponents of the non-biological hypothesis 
differ greatly in their theoretical perspectives on how infants come to understand self-propulsion 
and agency. According to the core-domain view (Carey, 1988), for example, infants’ concept of 
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self-propulsion is part of the skeletal explanatory framework that underlies core physical 
reasoning: When a novel object gives evidence that it is capable of autonomous motion (e.g., 
begins to move on its own), infants attribute to the object an internal source of energy, and they 
appreciate that the object may use its energy to reverse course, resist efforts to move it, resist 
falling when released in midair, and so on (Luo, Kaufman, & Baillargeon, 2009). Similarly, 
infants’ concept of agency is part of the skeletal explanatory framework that underlies core 
psychological reasoning: When a novel object provides evidence that it has autonomous control 
over its actions (e.g., responds contingently to events in its environment), infants attribute to the 
object motivational, epistemic, and other internal states, and they use these states to predict and 
interpret the object’s actions (Johnson, Shimizu, & Ok, 2007). In contrast, the image-schema 
view (Mandler, 2012) assumes that infants’ concepts of self-propulsion and agency are formed 
by a perceptual-meaning-analysis mechanism that re-describes spatiotemporal information into 
meaningful iconic representations. Thus, self-propelled objects are those that start moving by 
themselves, without contact with other objects, whereas agentive objects are those that interact 
contingently with other objects, again without contact. In the image-schema view, infants have 
no notion of internal energy or internal states—these concepts are acquired later in development, 
as enrichments of primitive spatial concepts. Despite their marked differences, however, both the 
core-domain view and the image-schema view assume that animals are, for infants, no more than 
self-propelled agents. 
 This assumption contrasts with the biological hypothesis, which admits the possibility 
that infants immediately ascribe to entities that are self-propelled and agentive additional 
properties that are vitalistic or biological in nature (Gelman, 1990; Keil, 2007; Opfer & Gelman, 
2010; Waxman, 2005). What might these biological properties be? One specific proposal, put 
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forth by R. Gelman (Gelman, 1990), is that infants are born with an innards principle: objects 
that are self-propelled and agentive “have something on the inside” that makes possible their 
behavior (p. 91). According to Gelman, “the principle is neutral with respect to the nature of 
what a child or anyone may think is in the inside” (p. 91). The innards principle is, of course, 
consistent with the findings on vitalistic biology reported earlier: Children might at first simply 
expect animals to have insides, and with experience they might gradually learn how the insides 
of animals differ from those of artifacts (Gottfried & Gelman, 2005; Simons & Keil, 1995), how 
the insides of specific kinds of animals differ from those of other animals (Gelman & O’Reilly, 
1988; Waxman, Medin, & Ross, 2007), and so on. In line with the innards principle, Gelman 
(1990) found that when asked what was on the inside of various artifacts and animals, children 
age 3 years and older sometimes said that an artifact had nothing on the inside, but they never 
said that an animal had nothing on the inside. 
 Is the non-biological or the biological hypothesis correct? One way to address this 
question is to test whether young infants expect objects that are self-propelled and agentive to 
have insides, in accordance with the innards principle. Therefore, we used the violation-of-
expectation method to ask whether 8-month-olds would detect a violation when a novel object 
that was self-propelled and agentive—but not an object that lacked one or both of these 
properties—was revealed to be hollow, like an inverted bowl. We reasoned that positive results 
would support the biological hypothesis by demonstrating that infants attribute to self-propelled 
agents additional properties that are biological in nature. 
 How likely were infants to attend to the insides of novel objects? Prior research with 14- 
month-olds indicates that infants do notice some objects’ insides. For example, infants assigned 
perceptually different objects with eyes to the same category if they possessed similar insides 
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(Welder & Graham, 2006); infants readily formed an association between a transparent object’s 
self-propelled motion and the presence of an internal part (Newman, Herrmann, Wynn, & Keil, 
2008); and infants also readily associated a transparent object’s particular style of self-propelled 
motion with the color of its internal part (Träuble & Pauen, 2011). Given these results, it seemed 
plausible that younger infants might also attend to the insides of novel objects. 
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CHAPTER 2  
EXPERIMENT 1 
 
 In Experiment 1, 8-month-olds from English-speaking families (n = 36) watched live 
events involving two novel objects: a large can covered with alternating stripes of red and grey 
yarn and a large box covered with beige paper and varying round patches of blue cloth with 
multicolored dots. Infants were assigned to a self-propelled/agentive condition or a non-self-
propelled/non-agentive condition. All infants received two familiarization trials, two pretest trials, 
and two test trials, one with the can and one with the box; half the infants received the can trial 
first in each pair of trials, and half received the box trial first. Only the familiarization trials 
differed between the two conditions. Each familiarization trial had an initial phase and a final 
phase; looking times during the two phases were computed separately. At the beginning of the 
(76-s) initial phase of the can trial in the self-propelled/agentive condition (Fig. 1a), the can 
rested at the center of the apparatus floor. To start, the can moved in a slight bouncing manner 
back and forth across the floor and then returned to its original position (this displacement lasted 
about 16 s and served to establish that the can was self-propelled; Luo et al., 2009). Next, a 
female experimenter opened a window in the back wall of the apparatus; the can then initiated a 
“conversation” by quacking at the experimenter, who responded contingently (this exchange 
lasted about 49 s and served to demonstrate that the can was agentive; Johnson et al., 2007). 
Finally, the experimenter left, closing her window behind her. During the final phase of the trial, 
the can rested at the center of the apparatus, and infants watched this paused scene until the trial 
ended. The box familiarization trial was identical except that the box moved in a slight zigzag 
manner and beeped at the experimenter. Infants in the non-self-propelled/non-agentive condition 
(Fig. 1b) received similar familiarization trials except that the can and box remained stationary 
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(thus providing no evidence that they were self-propelled; Luo et al., 2009), and the 
experimenter remained silent in response to the can’s quacks or the box’s beeps (thus providing 
no evidence that they were agentive; Shimizu & Johnson, 2004).  
 Next, all infants received the can and box pretest trials (Fig. 1e), which served to 
introduce infants to the actions performed in the test trials. In each trial, the experimenter lifted 
the can or box with both hands, tilted it right and left twice, returned it to the apparatus floor, and 
then repeated this entire (12-s) sequence until the trial ended. Finally, all infants received the can 
and box test trials (Fig. 1f). These were identical to the pretest trials except that, before tilting the 
can or box from side to side, the experimenter rotated it to reveal its bottom to the infant. When 
the objects were rotated, infants could see that one was hollow, like an inverted bowl (hollow 
trial), whereas the other one was closed, like a block (closed trial). For half the infants in each 
condition, the can was hollow and the box was closed; for the other infants, the reverse was true. 
2.1 METHODOLOGY 
Participants 
 Participants were 36 full-term infants (18 males, range: 7 months, 3 days to 9 months, 11 
days). Mean ages were 8 months, 4 days. Another 6 infants were tested but excluded because 
they looked the maximum time allowed in both test trials (5), or was distracted (1). 
Apparatus 
 The apparatus consisted of a brightly lit display booth (183 cm high ! 100 cm wide ! 57 
cm deep) with a large opening (55 cm ! 94 cm) in its front wall; between trials, a supervisor 
lowered a curtain in front of this opening. Inside the apparatus, the side walls were painted white, 
and the back wall (made of foam core) and floor were covered with colored adhesive paper. The 
experimenter was a female native English speaker. She wore a green shirt and sat at a window 
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(34 cm ! 48 cm) in the back wall of the apparatus; this back window could be closed with two 
identical doors. A large screen behind the experimenter hid the testing room. The can (18 cm ! 
17 cm in diameter) was wrapped with red and gray yarn in alternating stripes; the can had a 
removable gray felt bottom, and its interior was lined with beige felt. The box (18 cm ! 18 cm 
!18 cm) was covered with beige adhesive paper and decorated with varying round patches of 
blue cloth with multicolored dots; the box had a removable beige felt bottom, and its interior was 
lined with brown felt. In the familiarization trials, a long flat handle was attached to the bottom 
of the can or box and protruded through a narrow slit at the bottom of the back wall. In the self-
propelled conditions, the experimenter used the handle to move the can (in a slight bouncing 
manner) and the box (in a slight zigzag manner) along the apparatus floor, between pre-
determined marks. In the familiarization trials, the can or box also held a small speaker; its wire 
was tied to the handle and was connected, behind the apparatus wall, to an MP3 player. The can 
produced varying synthesized quacking sounds and the box produced varying beeping sounds; 
these sounds were pre-recorded on the MP3 player and played through the speaker in the can or 
box. In the agentive conditions, a small reminder card with the written conversation script was 
attached to the back of the can or box for the experimenter to follow; in the non-agentive 
conditions, the can and box produced the same sounds but the experimenter remained silent. 
During each test session, one camera captured an image of the events, and another camera 
captured an image of the infant. The two images were combined, projected onto a television set 
located behind the apparatus, and monitored by the supervisor to confirm that the trials followed 
the prescribed scripts. Recorded sessions were also checked off-line for accuracy. 
Procedure 
 Infants sat on a parent’s lap in front of the apparatus; parents were instructed to remain 
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silent and to close their eyes during the test trials. Two hidden observers helped monitor infants’ 
looking behavior and the primary observers’ responses were used in the analyses. The primary 
observer left the test room during the familiarization trials in order to be naive during the pretest 
and test trials about infants’ condition and trial order. Inter-observer agreement during the test 
trials averaged 95% per trial per infant. Infants were attentive during the initial phases of the two 
familiarization trials and looked, on average, for 81% of each initial phase. The final phase of 
each familiarization trial ended when infants (1) looked away for 2 consecutive seconds after 
having looked for at least 2 cumulative seconds or (2) looked for a maximum of 60 cumulative 
seconds. Each pretest and test trial ended when infants (1) looked away for 1 consecutive second 
after having looked for at least 5 cumulative seconds or (2) looked for a maximum of 50 
cumulative seconds; the 5-s minimum value ensured that infants had the opportunity to observe 
the rotated objects in the test trials.  
Preliminary analyses of the test data in this report revealed no interactions of condition 
and trial with infants’ sex or with order of the test trials; the data were therefore collapsed across 
these factors in subsequent analyses. 
2.2 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 Analysis of infants’ looking times during the test trials (Fig. 2) revealed a significant 
Condition X Trial interaction, F(1, 34) = 5.98, p = .020 (no such interaction was found in an 
analysis of the final phases of the familiarization trials or in an analysis of the pretest trials, both 
Fs(1, 34) < 1). Planned comparisons revealed that in the self-propelled/agentive condition, 
infants looked reliably longer during the hollow than the closed trial, F(1, 34) = 9.68, p = .004; 
15/18 infants showed this pattern. In the non-self-propelled/non-agentive condition, in contrast, 
infants looked about equally during the two trials, F(1, 34) < 1; 7/18 infants looked longer at the 
  9 
hollow event. Thus, infants detected a violation when the can and box were shown to be hollow, 
but only if they were self-propelled agents; if the objects were neither self-propelled nor agentive, 
infants held no expectations about whether they should have insides. 
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CHAPTER 3  
EXPERIMENT 2 
 
 To investigate the specificity of infants’ expectations about what objects should have 
insides, in Experiment 2 additional 8-month-olds from English-speaking families (n = 54) were 
assigned to one of three conditions. The self-propelled/agentive condition was identical to that in 
Experiment 1 (Fig. 1a). The other two conditions were similar except that in the familiarization 
trials either the experimenter remained silent (self-propelled/non-agentive condition; Fig. 1c), or 
the can and box remained stationary (non-self-propelled/agentive condition; Fig 1d).  
3.1 METHODOLOGY 
Participants 
 Participants were 54 full-term infants (27 males, range: 7 months, 7 days to 9 months, 9 
days). Mean ages were 8 months, 1 day. Another 17 infants were tested but excluded because 
they looked the maximum time allowed in both test trials (10), because they were fussy (4), or 
was distracted (2), or because the difference in their looking times during the two test trials was 
over 2.5 standard deviations from the condition mean (1).  
Apparatus 
 The apparatus was the same as Experiment 1.  
Procedure 
 The procedure was the same as Experiment 1. Inter-observer agreement during the test 
trials averaged 96% per trial per infant. Infants were attentive during the initial phases of the two 
familiarization trials and looked, on average, for 87% of each initial phase. 
Preliminary analyses of the test data in this report revealed no interactions of condition 
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and trial with infants’ sex or with order of the test trials; the data were therefore collapsed across 
these factors in subsequent analyses. 
3.2 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 Analysis of infants’ looking times during the test trials revealed a significant Condition X 
Trial interaction, F(2, 51) = 3.58, p = .035 (no such interaction was found in an analysis of the 
final phases of the familiarization trials,  F(2, 51) < 1, or in an analysis of the pretest trials, F(2, 
51) = 1.10, p = .340). In the self-propelled/agentive condition, as before, infants looked reliably 
longer during the hollow than the closed trial, F(1, 51) = 6.98, p = .011; 14/18 infants showed 
this pattern. In contrast, infants looked about equally during the two trials in both the self-
propelled/non-agentive and non-self-propelled/agentive conditions, both Fs < 1; 8/18 infants in 
each condition looked longer during the hollow trial. Thus, infants expected the can and box to 
have insides only if they were self-propelled and agentive; if they lacked either property, infants 
held no expectations about their insides. 
 The findings of Experiments 1 and 2 are important for three reasons. First, they provide 
new evidence that infants distinguish self-propelled agents from objects that are only self-
propelled or only agentive; infants do not expect all self-propelled objects to be agentive, nor do 
they expect all agentive objects to be self-propelled. Second, the results indicate that infants 
expect a novel self-propelled agent to have insides, in accordance with the innards principle. 
Finally, the results support the biological hypothesis by demonstrating that infants already 
possess abstract expectations about the insides of animals. 
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CHAPTER 4  
EXPERIMENT 3 
 
 Proponents of both the non-biological and biological hypotheses assume that, with 
experience, infants learn to use details of surface appearance and form as cues that novel objects 
are animals (this cue-learning process enables infants to rapidly identify novel animals without 
having to wait for evidence of autonomous motion and control). For example, previous research 
indicates that, by 7 months of age, infants already use fur on a self-propelled object as a cue that 
the object is an animal (Träuble & Pauen, 2011). When a ball and a furry object with a face 
moved together in close contact, infants attributed the source of the motion to the furry object; 
when the two objects later rested stationary side by side, infants looked reliably longer at the 
furry object as though they anticipated that it would move again. However, no such effect was 
found when an experimenter moved the ball and the furry object together with her hand. (In a 
survey we conducted of parents of 35 6- to 9-month-olds, 83% reported that their infant had 
touched a furry animal at least once, and 60% reported that their infant had regular contact with 
one or more furry animals. These results support the notion that infants in the second half-year 
have opportunities to identify fur as a predictive cue for animals). Building on these results, we 
asked in Experiment 3 whether 8-month-olds would expect an object that was furry and self-
propelled, but not an object that lacked one or both of these properties, to have insides. 
 Infants (n = 26) were assigned to a self-propelled or a non-self-propelled condition, and 
they watched events involving a new can that was covered with brown beaver fur and a new box 
that was covered with tan paper and edged with brown tape (Fig. 3). During the (32-s) initial 
phase of each familiarization trial in the self-propelled condition, the fur-can or box moved 
smoothly back and forth across the apparatus floor, to demonstrate that it was self-propelled; 
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during the final phase, the object paused at the center of the apparatus until the trial ended. The 
familiarization trials in the non-self-propelled condition were identical except that the fur-can 
and box rested on a tray, and the experimenter reached through a window in the back wall of the 
apparatus to move the tray back and forth. Next, all infants received pretest and test trials 
identical to those in Experiment 1 except that the fur-can (fur-can trial) and box (box trial) were 
both revealed to be hollow. 
4.1 METHODOLOGY 
Participants 
 Participants were 26 full-term infants (13 male, range: 6 months, 20 days to 9 months, 13 
days). Mean ages were 8 months, 26 days. Another 4 infants were tested but excluded because 
they looked the maximum time allowed in both test trials (2), because they were distracted (1), or 
overly active (1). 
Apparatus 
 The apparatus was the same as Experiment 1 except for the following differences. The 
window in the back wall of the apparatus that could be closed with two identical doors measured 
25 cm ! 48 cm. Instead of a yarn can, a fur-can (about 15 cm ! 22 cm in diameter) was used. It 
consisted of a brown beaver fur hat that was placed over an upright cylinder in the 
familiarization trials of the self-propelled condition; and in the fur-can pretest and test trials, the 
upright cylinder was replaced by an inverted cylinder lined with tan felt. Instead of the beige box, 
a box (15 cm !18 cm !18 cm) was covered with tan packing paper and edged with brown tape 
was used. In the box pretest and test trials, an exact copy of the box was used that had no bottom 
and was lined with brown felt. In the familiarization trials of the self-propelled condition, the fur-
can or box was again attached to a long flat handle; behind the wall, the experimenter used the 
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handle to move the object smoothly back and forth between pre-determined marks. In the 
familiarization trials of the non-self-propelled conditions, the fur-can or box rested on a pink tray 
(5 cm ! 29 cm ! 23 cm) with handles that was moved by the experimenter from the back 
window. The experimenter moved the tray in such a way that the fur-can and box travelled the 
same distance as in the corresponding self-propelled condition. 
Procedure 
 The procedure was the same as Experiment 1. Inter-observer agreement during the test 
trials averaged 93% per trial per infant. Infants were attentive during the initial phases of the two 
familiarization trials and looked, on average, for 85% of each initial phase. 
Preliminary analyses of the test data in this report revealed no interactions of condition 
and trial with infants’ sex or with order of the test trials; the data were therefore collapsed across 
these factors in subsequent analyses. 
4.2 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 Analysis of infants’ looking times during the test trials yielded a significant Condition X 
Trial interaction, F(1, 24) = 7.08, p = .014 (no such interaction was found in an analysis of the 
final phases of the familiarization trials or in an analysis of the pretest trials, both Fs(1, 24) < 1). 
In the self-propelled condition, infants looked reliably longer during the fur-can than the box trial, 
F(1, 24) = 16.22, p = .001; 12/13 infants showed this pattern. In contrast, infants in the non-self-
propelled condition looked about equally during the two trials, F(1, 24) = 0.80, p = .795; 7/13 
infants looked longer during the fur-can trial. Thus, infants expected the self-propelled fur-can to 
have insides, but they held no expectation about the insides of the non-self-propelled fur-can or 
about those of the box, whether it was self-propelled or not. These results also provide additional 
evidence that by 8 months infants use fur on a self-propelled object as a cue that it is an animal. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EXPERIMENT 4 
 
 In Experiments 1-3, infants detected a violation whenever an object they had identified as 
an animal was revealed to have no insides. To provide converging evidence for these results, in 
Experiment 4 we used a different manipulation to assess 8-month-olds’ expectations about 
insides: instead of rotating the fur-can and box from Experiment 3, the experimenter shook each 
object to demonstrate that it rattled, as though the shaking caused a few parts to bounce inside 
the object’s largely hollow interior. If infants expected the self-propelled fur-can to have insides, 
they should detect a violation when it produced a rattling noise when shaken, as though it was 
largely hollow inside. (To check our manipulation, we presented 20 adults with the rattling fur-
can and the rattling box, and we asked them to estimate based on the sounds they heard how full 
each object was inside. On average, subjects guessed that the objects were 28% full, supporting 
our claim that the rattling sounds conveyed that the objects were largely hollow). 
 Infants (n = 51) were assigned to a self-propelled, a non-self-propelled, or a control 
condition (Fig. 4). In the self-propelled condition, infants received the same fur-can and box 
familiarization trials as in the self-propelled condition of Experiment 3, for two pairs of trials. 
Next, infants received either a fur-can or a box test trial. During the (25-s) initial phase of each 
trial, the experimenter’s gloved hands (which reached through a curtained window in the right 
wall of the apparatus) first grasped the fur-can or box. Next, the hands lifted the object, shook it 
(causing it to rattle), and returned it to the apparatus floor; this sequence was repeated two more 
times, and then the hands rested on either side of the object. During the final phase, infants 
watched this paused scene until the trial ended (pilot data indicated that infants tended to look 
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continuously if the rattling persisted, so this non-repeating procedure was used instead). The 
non-self-propelled condition was identical except that in the familiarization trials the fur-can and 
box rested on a tray, and the experimenter’s right gloved hand moved the tray back and forth on 
the apparatus floor. Finally, because infants in the self-propelled condition might look longer 
when the fur-can rattled not because they expected it to have insides but because they had never 
seen an animal being shaken before, a silent-control condition was also included. This condition 
was identical to the self-propelled condition except that in the test trials the objects produced no 
noise when shaken.  
5.1 METHODOLOGY 
Participants 
 Participants were 51 full-term infants (26 male, range: 6 months, 17 days to 8 months, 5 
days). Mean ages were 7 months 15 days. Another 3 infants were tested but excluded because 
they were fussy (2), or drowsy (1). 
Apparatus 
 The apparatus was the same as Experiment 3 except for the following differences. In 
experiment 4, the experimenter wore long silver gloves and reached through a window (51 cm ! 
38 cm and filled with a fringed curtain) in the right wall of the apparatus. In the familiarization 
trials of the non-self-propelled conditions, the fur-can or box rested either on a yellow tray (5 cm 
! 23 cm ! 29 cm) without handles that was moved by the experimenter’s right gloved hand from 
the right window, and the fur-can and box travelled the same distance as in the corresponding 
self-propelled condition. The fur-can always sat on the upright cylinder and the box used had a 
closed bottom. In the test trials with rattling sounds, a small plastic bag filled with 22 1-cm metal 
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bells was partly affixed to the interior bottom surface of the fur-can or box; when the object was 
shaken briskly up and down, the bag bounced against the rigid bottom of the object, producing 
rattling sounds. 
Procedure 
 The procedure was the same as Experiment 3 except that in Experiment 4, observers 
could use available sounds to determine which test trials were shown; therefore, all final phases 
of the test trials were recoded frame-by-frame by two independent coders from edited silent 
videos. The two coders agreed on 97% of coded frames (trials with agreement below 90% were 
resolved through discussion). Infants received two pairs of familiarization trials and 1 test trial, 
and each trial had an initial and a final phase. Across conditions, infants looked, on average, for 
83% of each initial phase. The final phase of each trial ended when infants (1) looked away for 1 
consecutive second after having looked for at least 5 (familiarization) or 6 (test) cumulative 
seconds, or (2) looked for a maximum of 20 cumulative seconds. Shorter maximum values were 
used in Experiment 4 because infants received two pairs (instead of one pair) of familiarization 
trials and because the test trials used a non-repeating procedure with a final paused scene. 
5.2 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Analyses of infants’ looking times during the final phase of the test trial (Fig. 5) yielded a 
significant Condition X Trial interaction, F(2, 45) = 4.85, p = .012 (no such interaction was 
found in an analysis of infants’ averaged looking times during the final phases of the fur-can and 
box familiarization trials, F(2, 48) < 1). In the self-propelled condition, infants looked reliably 
longer if shown the fur-can as opposed to the box trial, F(1, 45) = 16.08, p = .0002; in the non-
self-propelled and silent-control conditions, in contrast, infants looked about equally at either 
trial, both Fs(1, 45) < 1. Thus, infants detected a violation when the fur-can produced a rattling 
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noise when shaken, but only if it was self-propelled. These results provide converging evidence 
that infants identify self-propelled furry objects as animals and expect their insides to be filled as 
opposed to hollow. 
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CHAPTER 6  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Together, these experiments indicate that 8-month-olds expect a novel object to have 
insides if they identify it as an animal. This identification may come about because the object 
gives evidence of autonomous motion and control, or because it presents cues with predictive 
validity for distinguishing animals from other objects. In either case, upon identifying the novel 
object as an animal, infants immediately expect it to have insides, in accordance with the innards 
principle. This expectation supports the biological hypothesis that infants already endow animals 
with biological properties. 
At least two main questions remain concerning infants’ expectations about insides. First, 
do infants regard an animal’s insides as essential for its functioning? If infants witnessed the 
removal of the insides of a novel self-propelled agent, would they expect it to no longer be 
capable of autonomous motion and control? Second, how should we conceptualize infants’ 
expectations about insides? There are at least three possibilities. One is that these early 
expectations are part of a skeletal explanatory framework that underlies core biological reasoning 
(Opfer & Gelman, 2010). In this view, infants would possess a naïve theory of biology as well as 
naïve theories of physics and psychology, though their naïve theory of biology might be less rich. 
Another possibility is that infants’ expectations about insides reflect general biases or modes of 
construal that are not exclusively tailored for biological phenomena (Gelman, 2009; Keil, 1992). 
For example, abstract biases for teleology and essentialism, perhaps with sparse conceptual 
constraints, might lead infants to posit various internal features in order to explain objects’ 
capacity for self-propulsion (internal energy), for agency (internal states), and for both self-
propulsion and agency (innards). Finally, a third possibility is that infants’ expectations about 
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insides arise from a quite different source—the cognitive systems that humans evolved to 
identify predators and preys and, more generally, to deal with animals as a food source (Barrett, 
2005). One striking aspect of the present findings is that infants did not expect objects that were 
only self-propelled or only agentive to have insides; apparently, internal energy or internal states 
do not at first require physical substrates. In contrast, infants expected objects that were both 
self-propelled and agentive to have physical insides. This physical-substrate requirement seems 
consistent with an interpretive framework that regards animals primarily as food. 
Whichever possibility turns out to be correct, it is clear that infants’ expectations about 
animals are highly primitive and that considerable conceptual elaboration and change must occur 
for young children to develop a more advanced understanding of biology. Nevertheless, the 
present research fits well with several developmental results. If infants construe animals as self-
propelled agents with biological properties, then it makes sense that (1) young children initially 
have difficulty constructing a category of living thing that includes plants as well as animals 
(Carey, 1985); (2) young children who are taught that plants engage in self-propelled, agentive 
motion immediately infer that plants are living things (Opfer & Siegler, 2004); and (3) school-
aged children and adults who see computer-animated blobs engage in self-propelled, agentive 
motion describe them as alive and attribute to them various biological properties (Opfer, 2002). 
All of these results suggest that key components of the interpretive framework that guides 
infants’ expectations about animals persist throughout life. 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Schematic drawing of the events shown in Experiments 1 and 2. In Experiment 1, the 
can and box were either self-propelled and agentive (a) or neither self-propelled nor agentive (b). 
In Experiment 2, the can and box were self-propelled and agentive (a), self-propelled but non-
agentive (c), or non-self-propelled but agentive (d). Whether the can trial or the box trial was 
shown first in the familiarization, pretest, and test trials was counterbalanced across infants in 
each condition; whether the can or the box was hollow in the test trials was also counterbalanced 
across infants in each condition. 
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Figure 2. Mean looking times of infants in Experiments 1-3 during the test trials as a function of 
condition and event. Errors bars represent standard errors, and an asterisk denotes a significant 
difference between the events within a condition (p < .05 or better). 
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Figure 3. Schematic drawing of the events shown in Experiment 3. Whether the fur-can trial or 
the box trial was shown first in the familiarization, pretest, and test trials was counterbalanced 
across infants in each condition.  
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Figure 4. Schematic drawing of the events shown in Experiment 4. Whether the fur-can trial or 
the box trial was shown first in the familiarization trials was counterbalanced across infants in 
each condition. In the test trial, infants saw either the fur-can or the box trial. 
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Figure 5. Mean looking times of infants in Experiment 4 during the final phase of the test trial as 
a function of condition and event. Errors bars represent standard errors, and an asterisk denotes a 
significant difference between the events within a condition (p < .05 or better). 
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